We demonstrate an approach to integrating reliability, performance, and operational procedures modeling into a system safety analysis. Our methodology is distinguished by its ability to merge system design information with the dynamic parameterization of a system's situation in order to measure accident statistics and reliable system operation. As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simultaneous, but independent approaches of two a i r d on closely-spaced parallel runways, Independent Approaches on Parallel Runways, or IAPR. The IAPR concept presumes a flight deck based navigation, communication, surveillance, 260 0-7803-4362-X/98/$10.00 0 1998 IEEE 1998 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium
and alerting system. The potential exists for an aircrafi on either runway to deviate off course toward another a i r d on the parallel runway. A variety of simulation projects have been undertaken within the last several years to explore alerting systems for the parallel approach situation, but the major limitation of statistical information generated f?om these studies is that it represents conditional safety statistics given the flight track simulated. To remove this conditioning, we have shown how to apply the probability of flying the approach with a given flight track using Markov analysis to compute this probability. The results show how each of the probabilities of reliable operation, accidents, and false alarms vary as a function of runway spacing.
I . INTRODUCTION

1,l Problem Definition
The continuing growth of air traffic will place demands on the current Air Traffic Management (ATM) system that cannot be accommodated without creating significant delays and economic impacts. To deal with this situation, work has begun to develop new approaches to providing a safe and economical air transportation infrastructure. Many of these emerging air transport technologies will represent radically new approaches to ATM, both for ground and air operations. The IAPR concept is one such example. In visual meteorological conditions (VMC), pilots accept responsibility for maintaining separation between their aircraft by visual means, For approaches conducted during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), air tmEc control personnel are responsible for the separation between the aircraft [Ref. l] . The FAA allows independent parallel approaches to be carried out in VMC with a runway separation minimum of 700 ft. In IMC, independent approaches may be conducted on runways spaced at least 4300 R apart. This minimum is reduced to 3400 ft if the airport is equipped with the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system [Ref.
21.
A study performed by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group has predicted significant increases in runway capacity per hour [Ref. 31 by reducing the minimum runway separation required for independent approaches. In order to benefit economically, the safety of independent approaches with reduced runway separation must be established. Figure 1 illustrates the integrated safety analysis. On the left side are the steps leading from requirements derived for an operational concept to the development of a reliability model of the system architecture that has been proposed to meet those requirements. This represents a traditional reliability modeling process. On the right are the models required to capture the environment in which the system is to operate as well as the interaction of those environmental models with response models representing the execution of the rules and procedures that have been developed for the candidate concept. Our approach to system safety analysis results from the integration of the Reliability Model and the Interaction-Response
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Model. The Interaction-Response Model tabulates how kother to require an alert and avoidance maneuver response. The Reliability Model provides, as a function of time, probabilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure states. Scaling the Operations Safety metrics from the Interaction-Response Model by the system state probabilities from the Reliability Model creates the system-level safety statistics. This process is illustrated in Figure 2 .
quently two systems come in close enough proximity to each operation-
Figure 1. Integrated Safety and Reliability Modeling and Evaluation
INDEPENDENT APPROACHES ON PARALLEL
RUNWAYS (IAPR)
Concept and Operational Procedures
In this paper, the IAPR system is modeled as a flight deck system without ground control support or interaction. It takes advantage of advances in communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies. Primary among these is Global Positioning System (GPS)-based navigation and digital communications for both surveillance and pilot information exchanges using the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system (ADS-B). GPS-based navigation will provide much more accurate aircraft position and velocity information, reducing the need for large protective bubbles around aircraft. The accuracy and speed of the ADS-B surveillance and broadcast data link system provides positional information among neighboring
aircraft. An aircrafi's alerting logic sounds alerts according to levels of 'encounter' criteria and an avoidance maneuver is initiated by the aircmft if the alert indicates a 'near collision' event. Figure 3 illustrates the IAPR analysis ffamework organized with respect to four major components: System Reliability Model, Impact Model, Interaction-Response Model, and Figure 3 is the 'Impact Model.' The function of the Impact Model is to associate a given system functional state from the reliability model with an operational capability of the aircraft and pilot. For example, a fully o ptional aircraft can execute a normal approach. The system functional state, fully operational, is associated with the flight capability, normal approach. Furthermore, the likelihood d the system functional state, filly operational, is quantified by the Reliability Model, while (conditional) safety metrics for the normal approach are determined fiom the Interachon-Response Model through a simulation process. The resulting system-level safety statistics are calculated by scaling the conditional safety metrics with the likelihood of the system ktional state as illustrated in Figure 2 . An in-depth examination of each of the four analysis components is presented in Section 3.
IAPR SAFETY ANALYSIS
Reliability Model
The objective of the reliability model is to predict the state of the aircraft capabilities at the start of and during an independent approach. In general, when an aircraft lines up for an independent approach, it will have been in-flight for several hours. Failures of components within the systems of the aircraft which have reduced its capabilities may have occurred.
The reduced capabilities, possibly undetected by the pilot, can a f % t the performance of the aircraft during the approach and result in the aircrafl drifting or blundering into the path of an k r a f t approaching the adjacent runway. The reliability model calculates the probabilities of the reduced capabilities that impact the safety of the aircraft when an independent approach is attempted.
The first step in developing the reliability model needed fix the IAPR system safety model is to define the aircraft functions relevant to the IAPR safety model as listed in Table 1 . These functions were developed by reviewing the current status d research on parallel runway approaches [Refs. 6, 71 and other related documentation [Refs. 9, 101.
The first three functions represent capabilities that need to be added to current commercial aircraft to support IAPR. The fourth function, Guidance and Control, represents all the capabilities and systems of the aircraft, exclusive of those required for the fmt three functions, that can affect safety of an independent approach. The fifth function isolates the capability the pilot (and crew) provides in the safe operation of the aircraft.
For the functions described in Table 1 , there are generally four system states: Fully Operational, Degraded, Failed Safe, and Failed Uncovered. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the block diagrams for the IAPR RNP Navigation function and the ADS-B Surveillance Data Link function, respectively. The other three functions are modeled analogously. In this model, each system component is assigned to only one function to maintain the independence of the functions. The advantage to maintaining the independence of the functions is that it allows the probability of any system state to be computed as a simple product. For example, the probability of the system being Fully Operational, at some time t, is simply the product pf the probabilities of each of the functions being in their Fully Operational states at time t. However, Markov analysis and modeling is not constrained to 'independent' decomposition. Under conditions where it would be important to model and evaluate functional dependencies, the analysis method can accommodate that type of complexity.
Table 1. IAPR System Functional Elements
The GPS Receiver and Inertial Navigation System ( 
Impact Model
From the description of the system reliability model given in the previous section, each possible system state can be associated with an impact that represents a potential reduction in system capabilities. To illustrate the safety methodology, dif- iates from own runer runway by 5-de9 I I with 5-deg-bank angle deviation.
Aircraft turns toward othership's runway followed by return to desired approach path with less than 1000ft lateral deviation Aircraft drifts off course away from own and other's runway, recognizes error, makes an adjustment to return to own flight path and overshoots toward othership's runway with less than 1 004 lateral deviation.
combined operational capability of the aircraft and the pilot that is consistent with a given system functional state. For example, a fully operational aircraft can execute a normal approach, whereas undetected or transient failures could result in unintentional 'drifting' of the aircraft &om a normal approach such as the fake or overadjust tracks. Degraded navigational capability could result in low-level or slow blundering such as 5- The Impact Model mapping used in this application is given in Figure 6 .
The notation, N1, AI, G1, and P1 refer to the fully operational state of the Navigation, Alerting, Guidance and Control, and Pilot functions, respectively. The notation, -S3, means any surveillance state except S3, the failed safe state. Likewise, N4 is the failed uncovered navigational state, while A3 is the failed uncovered state for the alerting avionics function. State N2 is the degraded navigational state, while P2 corresponds to 'recoverable' pilot error. States G3 and P3 are non-recoverable error states in the Guidance and Control and Pilot submodels, respectively.
Notice that the 'aircraft' is being modeled as a vector of the five functional components. Once this association is defined, the Markov model supplies the probabilities of the vector components. Ln this illustration, the resulting probability is the product of the component probabilities.
Interaction-Response Model
The Interaction-Response Model used in this study was originally developed at MIT [Refs. 5, 81. The performance of the prototype alerting system is evaluated using the piloted flight simulation tracks [Ref. 61 described above. In the evaluations, the threatened aircraft, the evader, always follows a normal approach path while the intruder follows one of the blunder or normal approach paths from the simulation tests. The alerting logic is implemented only on the evader. If an alert is issued, the evader performs a specified climbing-turn avoidance maneuver. The outcome of each approach is recorded according to the possible outcomes listed in Table 4 . A collision is defined to occur if separation at any point in the ap proach is less than 500 ft.
From Table 4 , if an alert is not issued at any time during a run, it is classified as either a Correct Rejection (if a collision did not occur) or as a Missed Detection (if a collision did occur). If an alert is issued, the outcome is placed in one of four categories. An Unnecessary Alert is a case where the intruder is not on a collision course, an alert is issued anyway, and a collision is still avoided. E a collision occurs because of the alert, it is classified as an Induced Collision. A Correct Detection occurs when a collision is averted because of an alert. Finally, a Late Alert is a case in which an alert is issued but is too late to prevent a collision.
The outcome categories of Table 4 can be combined to yield three safety statistics defined as follows:
Probability of Reliable Operation
Total # of Runs Table 5 shows the results of evaluating the three safety probabilities from the simulation outcome categories.
In this evaluation, eight pairs of flight tracks were evaluated at the 1700-ft runway spacing. A total of 183 runs were made for each pair of tracks, and the ownship was flying the normal approach at 145 kn. The alerting logic used in this baseline is a time/range-based threshold logic that invokes an evasive maneuver on the part of ownship if the othership is predicted to come within 500 ft of ownship within 11 s. The longitudinal initial condition spacing was incremented at 100-ft intervals, thereby producing the 183 runs for each pair of flight tracks.
Combining Model Outputs: System-Level Statistics
We now complete the example by multiplying the conditional safety statistics by the probability of flying the approach with a given flight track. This information is shown in Table   6 , Combined Results at 1700-ft Runway Spacing as well as a baseline evaluation at both 2500 ft, and 3400-ft runway spacing as given in Table 7 .
As the time in flight increases prior to runway approach, the overall hazard increases and reliable operation decreases. As the runway spacing between aircraft increases, the probabilities of collision and false alarm decrease while reliable operation increases and the probability of collision finally falls below the probability of false alarm. Clearly, the safety results suggest the investigation of trade-offs, and the methodology easily supports sensitivity analysis.
Areas for Future Work
Here are some areas in which greater model resolution is desired in order to more accurately predict the safety of the air transport concept: (1) Pilot Behavior: the issue of how o h a pilot chooses to ignore or override alerting system warnings 1998 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 
